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Abstract 
South Africa’s biggest single location-specific investment project is the proposed eight-fold 
expansion of South Durban’s port-petrochemical complex over the next three decades. 
There have been two substantial postponements of the main project – the ‘Dig Out Port’ in 
the place of Durban’s old airport – but no formal cancellation or plans for alternative land 
use. The project is estimated to cost $25 billion, but that could be dwarfed by typical 50-300 
percent price escalation. For example, the doubling of the petroleum pipeline capacity from 
Durban to Johannesburg recently cost $2.3 billion alone, after being initially estimated to 
cost just $600 million. In addition to the ‘economic violence’ that is represented by 
displacement and the opportunity cost of the investment, environmental violence in the 
area is already world famous. The notorious refineries owned by BP, Shell and the 
Malaysian firm Engen – Africa’s largest refinery complex – present major health threats to 
neighbouring residential areas. These neighbourhoods have been occupied by black South 
Africans for generations – the ‘Indian’ areas of Merebank and Clairwood and ‘coloured’ 
Wentworth –but have become slightly desegregated since the end of apartheid, mainly 
through the influx of low-income African shackdwellers. Because of sustained economic 
violence against Durban’s working class, in the form of systematic deindustrialisation since 
the early 1990s, jobs for a vast unemployed labour reserve are desperately needed. 
Government’s national planners claim the expansion of world shipping, from the ‘Panamax’ 
5000-container ships to super post-Panamax ships more than three times larger, will raise 
annual container traffic from 2.5 million to 20 million units processed annually in Durban 
by 2040. However, local residents’ organisations – united as the South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance (SDCEA) – offer multiple and overlapping critiques of this project, 
including the flawed participatory process; the destruction of small-scale farming and long-
standing neighbourhoods (with tens of thousands of expected displacements; major 
ecological problems in the estuarine bay; climate-change causes and effects; and irrational 
economics fuelled by overly generous state subsidies but still resulting in an unaffordable 
harbour. The framing of the campaign is of great importance not simply because the state 
and allied businesses promise tens of thousands of ‘jobs’ (in an increasingly capital-
intensive sector) but because an alternative vision has been established by SDCEA based on 
an ecologically-sensitive, labour-intensive economic and social strategy for the South 
Durban Basin. To achieve victory will require a major shift in the balance of forces, one 
which campaigners argue can be enhanced by a popular backlash: internationally-
coordinated economic violence – specially, financial sanctions – against the project and its 
parastatal corporate sponsor, Transnet. This is a site-specific project but one with more 
general lessons for grassroots contestation of industrial mal-development, in part because 
so many issue areas are up for contestation. The strategic and tactical questions include 
whether grassroots activists’ commitment to physical non-violence is going to be sustained 
against the system’s growing economic and ecological violence, and potential recourse to 





Introduction: Urban economic and environmental violence during the export era 
 
Two processes are underway that are uprooting urban conditions in many of the 
world’s cities, in the process amplifying the socio-ecological metabolism of capitalism: 
an intensified role for urban settings as export platforms, yet at the same time, 
contradictions associated with global overproduction, financial speculation and the 
subsequent slow-down of trade growth. What we can term economic and 
environmental violence is the logical result. Although we trace one source of this 
pressure back to neoliberal urban management three decades, these processes became 
more obvious since 2008, when many export-oriented cities appeared extremely over-
extended, including Durban, South Africa. Trade crashed dramatically during the second 
half of that year, and commodity prices fell further. In major port cities like Durban, 
there were social uprisings. Although few explicitly tackled the strategic matter of urban 
export orientation, the indirect causes of socio-political unrest can be traced to the 
perceived need to make such cities more friendly to export-oriented and increasingly 
unpatriotic capital, just as rising unrest occurs, too, in many financial-centric cities. 
 
Cities have always been the geographical containers in which production and commerce 
thrived. David Harvey sets the broader context: 
 
A city is an agglomeration of productive forces built by labour employed within a 
temporal process of circulation of capital. It is nourished out of the metabolism of 
capitalist production for exchange on the world market and supported out of a 
highly sophisticated system of production and distribution organised within its 
confines. It is populated by individuals who reproduce themselves using money 
incomes earned off the circulation of capital (wages and profits) or its derivative 
revenues (rents, taxes, interest, merchants’ profits, payments for services). The 
city is ruled by a particular coalition of class forces, segmented into distinctive 
communities of social reproduction, and organised as a discontinuous but spatially 
contiguous labour market within which daily substitutions of job opportunities 
against labour power are possible and within which certain distinctive quantities 
and qualities of labour power may be found.1 
 
The recent history of cities becoming more hyperactive export platforms – in contrast to 
earlier eras when production and consumption had more local backward and forward 
linkages – is not merely a function of globalisation. Public policy was a factor, and 
especially the intellectual project of urban neoliberalism. This was powerfully expressed 
in the form of a 1986 ‘New Urban Management Program’ at the World Bank, followed by 
similar efforts at the UN Development Program and UN Habitat. The market-centric urban 
policies were soon propelled by increasingly neoliberal funders such as the US Agency for 
International Development and their British, Canadian, Japanese and other official donor 
counterpart agencies. In 1990, the Urban Institute – paid by US AID – set out the core 
challenge, namely to compel a 
 
change in policy thinking in the developing world closely linked to the acceptance 
of market-oriented economies: the growing acceptance of rapid urbanisation.... An 
emphasis on national economic growth and export-led development will usually 
                                                          





mean that new investment resources must be directed to already successful 
regions and cities.... Governments have considerable control over the entire cost 
structure of urban areas. Public policy should be directed to lowering these costs.2 
 
Lowering these costs – especially by lowering the social wage and by subsidising export-
oriented infrastructure and services, often with Export Processing Zone techniques – is 
integral to a more direct insertion of ‘competitive’ cities into the world economy. As 
United Nations Habitat strategist Shlomo Angel explained: ‘The city is not a community, 
but a conglomerate of firms, institutions, organisations and individuals with contractual 
agreements among them’. Consequently, urban policy should focus on ‘creating a level 
playing field for competition among cities, particularly across national borders; on 
understanding how cities get ahead in this competition; on global capital transfers, the 
new economic order and the weakening of the nation-state’.3 
 
The strategy was explicit in South Africa’s transition from apartheid to export-oriented 
neoliberalism. It was based on intensifying the productivity of urban capital as it flows 
through urban land markets (enhanced by titles and registration), through housing 
finance systems (featuring solely private sector delivery and an end to state subsidies), 
through the much-celebrated (but extremely exploitative) informal economy, and 
through (often newly-commercialised and even privatised) urban services such as 
transport, sewage, water and even primary health care services (via intensified cost-
recovery). The Government of South Africa’s Urban Development Strategy states this 
agenda clearly: ‘Seen through the prism of the global economy, our urban areas are single 
economic units that either rise, or stagnate and fall together.... South Africa’s cities are 
more than ever strategic sites in a transnationalised production system’. 4  
 
But to be a ‘strategic site’ in an exceptionally competitive milieu requires urban 
reconfiguration. According to Kim Moody, one of the most experienced US labour 
analysts,  
 
Port extensions and the huge ‘back of the port’ logistics centres are gobbling up 
land and communities, often moving further and further inland. This in return 
requires new transport ‘corridors’. It isn’t just merchant capital because these 
relate to manufacturing production supply chains as well and, of course, 
commodities export. Pollution is massive. It was interesting to see that the 
apologists for all of this use the same bogus argument: less pollution or CO2 per 
container or product [because of economies of scale].5  
 
But there is an enormous risk associated with growing reliance upon the maritime 
sector, tourism and commodity exports, as the globalised economy begins what may 
become known as a 1930s-style ‘deglobalisation’ era. As The Economist argued in 
October 2013 in its cover story, entitled ‘The Gated Globe’,  
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Globalisation has clearly paused. A simple measure of trade intensity, world 
exports as a share of world GDP, rose steadily from 1986 to 2008 but has been 
flat since. Global capital flows, which in 2007 topped $11 trillion, amounted to 
barely a third of that figure last year. Cross-border direct investment is also well 
down on its 2007 peak… hidden protectionism is flourishing, often under the 
guise of export promotion or industrial policy. 6 
 
The pause button will no doubt be lifted. Yet in what was otherwise a celebration of 
global flows, the consulting firm McKinsey Global Institute also acknowledged that a 
peak had been reached in 2007 with $29.3 trillion in flows – 52 percent of world GDP – 
which then sunk in relative terms over the next five years, to just 36 percent: ‘This 
reflects the correction from the global credit bubble and deleveraging of the financial 
system. Financial flows have changed direction, too, with outflows from emerging 
markets rising from 7 percent of the global total in 1990 to 38 percent in 2012.’7 
Beginning in May 2013, investors roiled South Africa and four other major emerging 
markets when the US Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing began to be phased out 
(‘tapered’). As a result of US interest rates slightly higher, outflows meant that four of 
the five BRICS – South Africa, India, Brazil and Russia (which suffered again from 
financial sanctions imposed after its Crimea invasion) – experienced substantial 
currency crashes that, in turn, would limit import capacity. Even China’s property 
bubble burst in the 44 largest cities by 19 percent in 2013-14.8  All indications are that 
2015 was worse, and was amplified in June-July by a $4 trillion stock market crash. 
 
Global flows of goods, services and finance: absolute $ (tn), share of GDP, 1980-2012 
 
Source: McKinsey (2014, 14) 
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Trade growth rates at world, advanced-capitalist and emerging-economy scales 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
 







Because of the economic turmoil roiling the BRICS, Indonesia, Turkey and similar sites, 
it is wise to recall the United Nations warning, that the world’s financial markets aim to 
shift ‘high-risk activities from more to less strictly regulated environments,’ especially 
sites where massive state-subsidised and guaranteed infrastructure projects are 
envisaged.9  In these sites, both borrower and lender are facing intense levels of 
desperation: to sink excess funds into mega-projects on behalf of multinational capital.  
 
The decline (1900-2002), rise (2002-11) and crash (2011-present) of commodity prices 
reflects this desperation, and in turn helps explain why ports are facing such intense 
competition with fewer surpluses to draw upon for the sake of financing expansion. 
From the early 1980s, the Third World Debt Crisis compelled commodity-producing 
economies to lower the value of their currencies and increase exports so as to pay off 
their debt. The commercial banks and Bretton Woods Institutions restructured these 
economies into neoliberal export platforms. Until 2002, there was a distinct downturn 
in world commodity prices, but a turning point in 2002 reflected a new critical mass in 
East Asian (especially Chinese) imports of raw materials. This led to a massive price 
spike that withstood the 2008-09 crash and ultimately peaked in 2011. Since then the 
prices of nearly every major mineral and fossil fuel has crashed, often by more than half.  
With slowing demand from China, the overall result contributed to a decline in world 
trade, not only dramatically in the 2008-09 Great Recession, but in the period from mid-
2011 to the present as global overproduction trends resurfaced.   
 
Commodity price changes, 1900-2015 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia 
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Also since 2012, there has been a major decline in annual Foreign Direct Investment at 
world scale, with the peak of $1.56 trillion reached in 2011, followed by a drop to $1.40 
trillion in 2012 and to $1.23 trillion in 2014.10  The anticipated increase in US Federal 
Reserve interest rates in December 2015 is anticipated to slow real-economy activity 
even further, and one indication of the latter is the glut in corporate savings that follows 
a steady recent decline in corporate investment that in turn follows the decline in the 
rate of profit. 
 
  
Source: Michael Roberts 
 
One specific victim of this stagnation is shipping. The mid-2008 peak for pricing 
transport of a typical container reflected the intense metabolism of commodity trading 
at the time, and fell by more than 90 percent within six months. But even though after 
the 2009 recovery commodity prices resumed their rise, the Baltic Dry Index of 
shipping prices never recovered to even a third of their peak, and in late 2015 are at a 
30-year low.  
 
Indeed to carry a container from Shanghai to the US East Coast in March 2015 cost 
$2500, a price that fell to $1500 by June. At the same time, there was a dramatic rise in 
the capacity of ‘post-Panamax’ ships – carrying more than 5000 containers (until 2015 
the limits of the size that fit through the Panama Canal) – to the point that ships with 
more than 15,000 containers were flooding the market. Such ships were so robotised 
that they had only 13 crew.  
 
 
                                                          









There was unevenness in the shake-out that followed. The massive port construction 
projects that Chinese state capital had promoted along its Maritime Silk Road began to 
face the harsh reality of overcapacity. There are fifty major ports with more than a 
million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of which a large proportion are on the Chinese 
coast. Like the real estate and stock market bubbles, these ports were due to shake out 
their vast overcapacity in the years ahead.  
 







The world’s 50 largest container shipping terminals 
 
 
The question that many shipping observers in Latin America, Africa and Asia were 
forced to ask in 2015, was whether their own capacity expansion had also gone too far. 
Would crashing commodity prices, rising US interest rates, ongoing European 
stagnation and emerging market slumps (especially in the three most vulnerable BRICS: 
Brazil, Russia and South Africa) together doom shipping growth and thus the new port 
developments? And what, then, would that structural combination ‘from above’ imply 
for urban politics ‘from below’? There is nowhere better than Durban, South Africa, to 
enquire into the port-related urban economic and also environmental implications of 
this more frenetic, crisis-ridden stage of world capitalism. 
 
Durban’s port-petrochemical complex under contestation 
 
South Africa’s biggest single location-specific investment project ($25 billion – the cost 
estimated prior to what could become a typical 50-300 percent price escalation) is the 
proposed eight-fold expansion of South Durban’s port-petrochemical complex over the 
next three decades. The doubling of the Durban-Johannesburg petroleum pipeline’s 
capacity recently cost $2.3 billion. Notorious oil refineries run by BP, Shell and the 
Malaysian firm Engen present major health threats to neighbouring residential areas.  
 
These neighbourhoods have been occupied by black South Africans for generations – 
the ‘Indian’ areas of Merebank and Clairwood and ‘coloured’ Wentworth –but have 
become slightly desegregated since the end of apartheid, mainly through the influx of 
low-income African shackdwellers. In South African terminology, the African, Indian 
and Coloured people have been considered ‘Black’ in relation to the need to fuse their 
interests against the historic white apartheid project, though after 1994 when 
democracy was won, the breakdown of the cross-racial alliances has often been a 





was great in 1994, given large tracts of land and the need for densification. By all 
accounts, practically no progress was made.  
 
Jobs for South Durban’s vast unemployed labour reserve are desperately needed, and 
government planners claim the expansion of world shipping, from the Panamax 5000-
container ships to super post-Panamax ships more than three times larger, will raise 
annual container traffic from 2.5 million to 20 million units processed annually in 
Durban by 2040. However, local residents’ organisations – united as the South Durban 
Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA) – offer multiple overlapping critiques of 
this project, including the flawed participatory process; the destruction of small-scale 
farming and long-standing communities (with tens of thousands of expected 
discplacements; major ecological problems in the estuarine bay; climate-change causes 
and effects; and irrational economics fuelled by overly generous state subsidies but still 
resulting in an unaffordable harbour.  
 
The framing of the campaign is of great importance not simply because the state and 
allied businesses promise tens of thousands of ‘jobs’ (in an increasingly capital-
intensive sector) but because an alternative vision is being established by SDCEA based 
on an ecologically-sensitive, labour-intensive economic and social strategy for the South 
Durban Basin. To achieve victory will require a major shift in the balance of forces, one 
which campaigners argue can be enhanced by financial sanctions against the project 
and its parastatal corporate sponsor, Transnet. This is a site-specific project but one 
with more general lessons for grassroots contestation of industrial mal-development, in 
part because so many issue areas are up for contestation. 
 
Global contradictions are often amplified at lower scales, especially when intensified 
metabolisms of capitalist commerce and energy threaten widespread displacement, 
pollution and community unrest. The ‘spatial fix’ to overaccumulation crisis is 
witnessed in the ongoing restructuring of world shipping, while externalities such as 
greenhouse gas emissions represent ‘accumulation by dispossession,’ as capital takes 
further control of non-capitalist territories, consistent with theories of imperialism and 
crisis displacement pioneered by Rosa Luxemburg.11 
 
To illustrate with a detailed South African case study sometimes termed Africa’s 
‘armpit’ (for its noxious smell), the expansion of the Durban port and petrochemical 
complex is the main site-specific ‘Strategic Investment Project’ within the state’s 
National Development Plan. South Durban is the second highest-priority mega-project 
(after the Waterberg-Richards Bay coal infrastructure expansion). The investments will 
expand what is already Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest port (in North Africa, only 
Alexandria is bigger) to a capacity that the 2012 National Development Plan claims 
must be large enough to handle 20 million TEU containers annually, up from 2000s 
annual volumes averaging 2.5 million.12 (Other subsequent estimates are more modest, 
with the most ambitious Transnet documents suggesting 13 million TEU containers is 
the objective of the port expansion.) 
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Raising the vast funds required will be the most critical challenge, given that the leading 
local civil society network, the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance 
(SDCEA), has announced a ‘financial sanctions’ campaign against the project. The first 
phase of the work, costing approximately $4 billion, was pre-funded by the South 
African government and allied financiers, but the major contestations ahead are over 
the much greater needs entailed in a new ‘Dig Out Port’ to be built on the site of the 
city’s old airport. 
 
Transnet’s investment strategy  
 
In March 2013, during the Durban summit of the heads of state of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and SA (BRICS), a Chinese bank lent $5 billion to the parastatal corporation 
responsible for the port expansion, Transnet. This was mainly for the purpose of 
extending rail infrastructure further into the northern and eastern coal fields for 
subsequent coal exports mainly to India and China. The environmental violence 
associated with the resulting climate change will be extreme, even if both China and 
India claim to be cutting back dramatically on coal imports, perhaps leaving the first 
major infrastructure project stymied as a white elephant. 
 
The funds also provided resources for the purchase of locomotives (mainly from 
Chinese producers, mainly for the Waterberg-Richards Bay route) and for Durban’s 
harbour expansion, since such funding is essentially fungible. In addition to increasing 
the speed and magnitude of freight to the world’s largest coal export terminal, at 
Richards Bay, Transnet has also been planning a fully-privatised port management 
model for the Durban Dig Out Port.  
 
Medium-term South Durban Dig-Out Port 
 
 
Durban is also now a site of proposed offshore oil prospecting by ExxonMobil, not far 
from the point where Africa’s largest refinery complex stands in hyper-toxic South 
Durban. There, near-universal community opposition has emerged to Transnet’s plans, 
including on grounds of climate damage. Transnet’s Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) consultants made a contentious statement in 2013 – that larger ships in the new 
port will allegedly result in lower emissions per container carried – because they failed 






The South Durban Basin from the main harbor to the proposed Dig Out Port site  
  
2014-2040 components of Durban’s port expansion 
 
 
The first set of projects will result a dramatic increase in existing port capacity, so that 
the 5000+ container ‘post-Panamax’ ships can be accommodated in the current harbor 
(stages 1-3). Originally, the dig-out port at the old airport site was to be excavated in 
2016, with an anticipated first berthing in 2020 (stage 4), but in November 2015 
Transnet announced an indefinite postponement due to adequate existing capacity. The 
final growth of the existing port will include an extensive dig-out of the area currently 
under Transnet railroad siding property (stages 5-6).  
 
With liberalisation of transport in the early 1990s and the move of freight to road-based 
trucking, this land remains mostly unused. In contrast, much of the land surrounding 
Durban’s highway exits has been captured since then, for use by commercial 
wholesalers for container truck unpacking and repacking, which cements the reliance 
upon trucks notwithstanding the state’s ‘truck-to-rail’ rhetoric.  
 
In addition to spatial sprawl, patterns of racial discrimination are also evident. The 
latter stages of the Dig Out Port project are in close proximity to the predominantly 
Indian areas of Isipingo and Merebank in the south and Clairwood in the north, as well 
as the African township of Umlazi and the coloured Wentworth area. The Clairwood 
area is most immediately threatened by Stages 1-3 port expansion, as trucking 






Racial composition of South Durban neighborhoods 
 
 
Transnet’s most critical challenge will be finding the money for an estimated $25 billion 
worth of other mega-projects , especially given the scale of the project and how many 
aspects are being contested. The Chinese bank loan apparently comes without 
conditions (and with terms not publicly disclosed), and subsequently, there were also 
several bond offerings of several hundred million dollars, including in the London 
markets in November 2013 where Transnet paid an enormous premium on its Rand-
denominated bonds: 9.5 percent. But the longer-term threat to South Durban and other 
communities is that the BRICS New Development Bank launched in July 2015 will seek 
projects like this one, as exemplars of export-oriented infrastructure.  
 
In July 2013, a high-profile meeting of the Durban Transport Forum heard Transnet’s 





analysis yielded many risks but no show-stoppers.’13 Descoins had not, at that time, 
factored in either the broader economic problems described above, nor resident and 
labour opposition to the mega-project, its vast environmental implications, or rising 
disgust about construction-driven White Elephants. Tracing several of the problems 
with the port-petrochem expansion in South Durban sheds light on the interconnections 
between social and environmental grievances, as well as a growing debate about SA’s 
vulnerability to the world economy. 
 
The doubling of oil pipeline capacity 
 
Transnet’s Durban-Johannesburg oil pipeline construction project lasted from 2007-14. 
The mega-project, known as the ‘new multi-product pipeline’, cost $2.34 billion, a 
dramatic cost escalation in part because the pipeline was diverted hundreds of 
kilometers from the traditional route west along the N3 highway. That route ran 
through mostly-white Durban suburbs (Mariannhill, Hillcrest, Shongweni and 
Camperdown), and now the pipeline moves double the pre-existing oil volume through 
(mostly-black) South Durban, Umbumbulu and other former KwaZulu bantustan areas. 
According to Durban’s leading environmental journalist, Tony Carnie, ‘The $600 million 
petrol, diesel and jet fuel pipeline will replace the existing Durban-to-Johannesburg 
pipeline which was built in 1965. The existing pipeline is believed to have rust defects 
and cannot cope with the future demand in fuel growth in Gauteng.’14 By moving the 
project southwards before turning west, the cost estimate rose by more than 50 
percent. But there were many other cost increases, with the total reaching $2.34 billion 
by 2013, in part because of apparent construction company collusion on tendering by 
one of the main pipeline construction companies, Group Five Civil Engineering.15 
 
In his own 2012 review of the cost overruns, without considering construction company 
collusion, Public Enterprises Minister Malusi Gigaba uncovered ‘systemic failings that 
compromised the intended outcomes’ and he admitted that his project managers ‘lacked 
sufficient capacity and depth of experience for the client overview of a megaproject of 
this complexity,’ especially related to ‘analysis of risks.’ Nor were EIAs or water and 
wetland permits ‘pursued with sufficient foresight and vigour.’16 Well before this 
became public knowledge (Group Five only stepped forward to confess its role in 
industry collusion in 2009), SDCEA offered several critiques of the pipeline, including 
the racially-biased routing; inadequate public participation; dubious motivations for the 
pipeline; government’s failure to prevent, detect or manage pipeline leaks; and climate 
change.17 According to SDCEA, the race and class bias were crucial reasons to reject 
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Transnet’s re-routing strategy, because ‘The pipeline threatens people with potentially 
severe environmental safety and health problems (well known to refinery victims in 
South Durban), in a manner that is discriminatory along class and racial lines.’ The local 
ecology itself was already saturated with toxins, SDCEA alleged in 2008: 
 
Durban Bay, in which the harbour is situated, is struggling to cope with the 
pollution loads from harbour and associated activities, contaminated riverine 
and storm-water inflows. The expansion will require further removal of aspects 
of the Bay’s ecosystem, which will in turn further reduce the assimilative 
capacity of this threatened and fragile estuary. There have been major incidents 
affecting the harbour, including the September 2007 fire at Island View Storage. 
Reducing the amount of hazardous material being stored, handled and 
transported in the harbour is a crucial first step to reducing the risk to people 
living, traveling and working in the area. Yet the pipeline proposal will do the 
opposite. The routing of the pipeline south, directly through low-income black 
residential areas instead of through areas including farming lands owned by 
wealthy white South Africans, is suspiciously reminiscent of the environmental 
racism we in South Durban have become familiar with… The leaks that have 
occurred in existing petroleum pipelines have been devastating to South Durban, 
including the 1.3 million liters that spilled from Sapref lines in 2001, that were 
not detected until residents complained. According to present practices, only a 
leak of more than 1 percent will be detected. Incidents leading to a loss of 
product which is not detectable by the system may continue to pollute the soil 
and groundwater for a long time. During this period, many people, fauna and 
flora may be affected by the consequences of the pollution and not understand 
the cause until it is too late. In this case, the costs will not be borne by the 
polluter, as our legal framework requires.18 
 
Many of the same complaints arose again four years later, in mid-2012, when the next 
stage of the port-petrochem complex reached fruition: the proposal for a new dig-out 
port and expansion of the old port. The most heart-felt of the critiques levelled was 
against displacement because, for many Indian and African residents of South Durban, 
their earlier neighbours during apartheid were moved to South Durban from Cato 
Manor, a well-located residential area. This was part of the white government’s racial 
displacement strategy. Now the same appeared imminent, though this time for class 
reasons. 
 
Displacement and the trucking threat  
 
SDCEA, the Wentworth Development Forum and Merebank Residents Association and 
the Clairwood Residents and Ratepayers Association are justifiably convinced that the 
port-petrochem project will generate not just traffic chaos, but residential displacement 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
required. Accelerating the upgrade of railways and public transport in Gauteng, so as to get more people 
and product off the roads to minimise transport-related congestion, fuel burning, emissions and 
associated health effects, by establishing urban transport networks to enable safe and affordable rail 
transport, linked to park and ride centres with connections to bus and taxi routes.’ 
18. Ibid. On the climate, according to SDCEA, ‘the rise of CO2 emissions that will be facilitated by the 
pipeline is immense, and is only referred to in the Draft Scoping Report as a potential legal problem, with 





on a very substantial scale. From the north, the old harbour’s expansion creep will 
displace residents by the thousands from the culture-rich, 150 year old Indian and 
African community of Clairwood. That area’s African shackdwellers and long-time 
Indian residents are already under threat from reckless trucking companies, who are 
beneficiaries of the rezoning – or simply failure to enforce existing zoning – that 




In the process of liberalised zoning and lack of residential area zoning enforcement by 
the municipality, ten Clairwood and nearby Bluff suburb residents were killed in the 
decade 2003-13 by truck accidents. Mostly carrying freight, these drivers killed 70 
people in the course of 7000 accidents in Durban in 2012 alone. The worst single case 
occurred in September 2013, when 23 people were killed by a runaway freight truck on 
the Field’s Hill section of the alternative (non-tolled) highway from Johannesburg, 
which was far steeper than the tolled route. 
 
The tragic accident was revealing, for one of the world’s three largest shipping 
companies, Evergreen, hired a local informal truck company which allegedly instructed 
its driver to avoid the tolls to save $2.50. Police cracked down after the accident and 
found several of the company’s trucks operating under unsafe conditions. The one that 
hit two commuter taxis was driven by an unqualified, underpaid immigrant driver; the 
truck’s brakes failed on one of the steepest highways in the country. A few weeks later, 
government proposed restricting that particular hill to only 5 tonne trucks, banning 16 






Local ecological degradation 
 
Opposition from local communities will grow even more intense once the largest part of 
the port expansion begins. The proposed dig out port is where the old airport stood, on 
the southern border of the Merebank neighbourhood. To dig a 1.5 kilometre length of 
soil 20 meters deep is dangerous, given how many toxic chemicals have come to rest 
there over the years. Even Descoins conceded, ‘We have to look at contamination issues. 
Hydrocarbons have been pumped around this area for decades and we know there have 
been some leaks.’ That soil, water and air pollution will exacerbate the five-year dust 
cover under which the dig-out port’s construction will suffocate Merebank and 
Wentworth, the mainly Indian and coloured communities of South Durban. These 
neighbourhoods are already coated with regular oil-related sulfur and soot showers 
from the oil refining complex, as witnessed in their world-leading asthma rates.  
 
In addition to damage to human health, BirdLife SA observed that, since Durban has one 
of just three estuarine bays in SA, its ‘ecosystem services’ value of goods and services is 
vast: as a heat sink and carbon sink, for biodiversity, as a fish nursery, for waste 
disposal, and for storm protection. Moreover, the Bonn Convention’s protections for 
bird migration should make estuaries and wetlands, such as South Durban’s, immune 
from more cementing. In May 2013, Gigaba dismissed the worries over ‘frogs and 
chameleons’.19 In contrast, the ecological damage implied in this stage of Transnet’s 
expansion was so extreme that the Department of Environmental Affairs rejected the 
first version of the EIA in October 2013, which described the impacts of the build-out of 
Berths 203-205 – then able to handle ships of no more than 12 meters depth – so as to 
accommodate super-post-Panamax ships of 15 000 containers or more.  
 
The existing and future harbour: Berths 203-205 (foreground) and expansion plan 
 
 
One of the two reasons was Transnet’s failure to do more than ‘monitor’ the damage 
caused to the major sandbank in the middle of the estuarine bay, which hosts so many 
reproductive processes for fish and birdlife.20 As SA’s leading maritime journalist Terry 
Hutson remarked at the time: 
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In Durban there is little likelihood of any big growth in volumes in the near 
future. A few years ago, the port went backwards in the number of containers it 
handled, dropping something like 200,000 TEU in a year and there has been little 
growth since… So the questions remain: Does Durban need the deeper berths 
and aren’t the bigger ships premature?21 
 
Global ecological implications and local climate adaptation 
 
The other reason Transnet suffered an early rejection of its EIA was due to the most 
important environmental problem of all, climate change. The firm’s consultants simply 
did not consider the impact of rising sea levels or extreme storms.22 As oceans warm up, 
cyclones and hurricanes intensify, with resulting sea-level rise. ‘The volume of Arctic sea 
ice has been reduced by 75 percent in just 30 years,’ reported the world’s most 
respected climate scientist, James Hansen in 2012: ‘There is a danger that the ice sheets 
will begin to collapse and we could get several meters of rising sea levels in one year.’23 
At that rate, big parts of central Durban would sink, along with other cities where 
coastal sprawl has left millions in low-lying danger: Mumbai (2.8 million inhabitants 
exposed as sea waters rise), Shanghai (2.4 million), Miami (2 million), Alexandria (1.3 
million) and Tokyo (1.1 million). 
 
Durban recently suffered early indications of 
extreme weather events and associated damage. 
In March 2007, in one storm exacerbated by 
unusual tidal activity akin to a tsunami, Durban’s 
main municipal official reported ‘wave run-up 
heights’ which ‘peaked at 10.57 meters above 
Mean Sea Level.’ The bulk of the beach sand was 
washed away along the coast and nearly a billion 
dollars’ worth of coast infrastructure was 
destroyed. In June 2008, a storm submerged much 
of the South Durban Basin’s main valley, cutting 
off the Bluff and Wentworth from the main access 
highway. In November 2011, the day before the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (COP17) summit began in Durban, a 
rainstorm wreaked such havoc that a dozen 
people died when their poorly-constructed 
publicly-funded houses collapsed. In August 2012, 
the same Durban port berths (203-205) proposed for expansion were severely damaged 
during heavy winds which bumped a ship up against cranes, resulting in a two week-
long closure, and the Engen oil refinery was largely submerged by flooding.  
 
Just as important, what of the mitigation challenge associated with the port-petrochem 
complex? According to the Academy of Science of SA’s 2011 book, Durban: Towards a 
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Low Carbon City, ‘The transport sector is pivotal to the transition to a low carbon city... 
The top priority was identified as the need to reduce the vehicle kilometers travelled in 
the road freight sector as this provided the greatest opportunity to simultaneously 
reduce emissions of GreenHouse Gases and traditional air pollutants.’24 The port-
petrochem expansion will do the opposite, in part because for decades, Transnet 
sabotaged its own rail freight capacity, allowing road trucking of container traffic to 
surge from 20 to 80 percent.  
 
Yet in addressing the obviously adverse ecological implications of their project, 
Transnet hired Nemai Consulting, an EIA specialist with no apparent climate 
consciousness. They in turn hired a sub-contractor, an official of the SA Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research, whose 2011 report, ‘Modelling of potential 
environmental change in the port marine environment’, also completely ignored climate 
change. Follow-up with officials of Nemai in 2012 generated this reply: ‘The project will 
decrease the ship waiting and turnaround times which will have a lower carbon impact’. 
The consultants did not factor in the dynamic aspects of the shipping system, meaning 
that if there is an increase in efficiency by reducing the ships’ offshore wait, the result is 
to speed up the system as a whole, thus increasing carbon impact.25 
 
The same carefree attitude to climate was evident in the doubling of oil pipeline 
capacity from Durban to Johannesburg. According to a SDCEA EIA critique that was 
ignored by officials, 
 
The proposed pipeline will make a vast contribution to the climate crisis, yet the 
EIA only speaks in two areas, very briefly, of this problem. The Draft Scoping 
Report notes that the current Durban International Airport site is within the 
1:100 year flood plain, and that the Island View site is ‘potentially affected by sea 
level rise in the future as a result of climate change’. The Scoping Report 
promises to consider this in the future EIA. In addition, the Draft Scoping Report 
summary notes in ‘TABLE 5-1: Summary of legal requirements that apply to the 
project and the EIA process’ that the Kyoto Protocol is relevant, as it ‘Commits a 
country to quantified emissions limitations and reductions’. 
In the first instance, SDCEA does not believe the Draft Scoping Report has 
begun to grapple properly with location of the pipeline along the South Coast. As 
our appendix of photographs of 2007-08 storm damage shows, even concrete 
structures came under severe attack from the elements and were found wanting, 
as a result of locations in low-lying coastal areas, including The Bluff, Wentworth 
and Merebank, through which the new pipeline will run. Other areas of 
Amanzimtoti and the South Coast were demolished in June 2008.  
The Draft Scoping Report treats these dangers casually, in spite of the 
record of public infrastructural decay noted above, in which a variety of pipeline 
maintenance crises have arisen, causing enormous ecological despoilation. 
Second, the rise of CO2 emissions that will be facilitated by the pipeline is 
immense, and is only referred to in the Draft Scoping Report as a potential legal 
problem, with no details provided. Since Minister of Environment and Tourism 
Marthinus van Schalkwyk has committed South Africa to substantive emissions 
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cuts which will be formalised at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, a huge effort by all state agencies, including Transnet, will be 
required to reduce emissions in all areas. The proposed pipeline does the opposite, 
just as South Africa enters the 21st century with emissions that are 42 percent of 
the entire African continent’s output, and 20 times higher per unit of per capita 




Ironically, in spite of all the socio-economic controversies, financing for the port-
petrochem project may ultimately be threatened most by the project’s inefficiency and 
lack of economic feasibility. The argument in favour of the port is mainly that jobs will 
be created and SA will have world-class infrastructure for export-led growth. But rising 
capital intensity at Transnet along with trade-related deindustrialisation may result in 
fewer manufactured exports as well as net employment loss. This has been the norm 
since 1994 when democracy also ushered in economic liberalisation after SA joined the 
World Trade Organisation. Subsequent port expansion and Transnet restructuring did 
not create new jobs, but destroyed employment.  
 
Durban port’s economic inefficiency
 
 
The project only makes financial sense if South Africa’s economic development 
mentality is locked into national boundaries established in Berlin during the colonial 
‘Scramble for Africa’ in 1885, the point at which borders were determined by white men 
representing imperial interests. As the region’s main port-rail link to the largest market, 
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Gauteng – and from there to the rest of the subcontinent – Durban is facing stiff 
competition from Maputo in Mozambique for shipments to Johannesburg, because it is a 
more direct, shorter and much less mountainous journey. In addition, there is general 
container-handling competition from other ports along the coast attempting to set up 
regional freight hubs and export processing zones, including a vast state-subsidised 
complex, Coega, in the Eastern Cape near Port Elizabeth.27  
 
As it stands, Durban’s costs of processing freight are the highest in the world, at $1080 
per container, or $280,000 per typical ship. What port advocates have not been able to 
do is explain how an additional $25 billion in investments (no doubt much more what 
with recent trends tripling original estimates) will cut operating and maintenance costs 
to competitive levels. Repaying the principle, interest on the capital, and all the 
additional costs will force much higher container handling charges, leaving the real 
prospect of another white elephant. In Durban, similar projects that were anticipated to 
earn profits – such as the airport, convention centre and marine entertainment complex 
– all have needed multi-million dollar annual taxpayer bailouts. 
 
An alternative strategy 
 
Is an alternative to this flawed economic development strategy possible? A very 
different Strategic Investment Project would recognise the urgent need to detox South 
Durban and reboot the local economy towards more labour-intensive, low-polluting 
industry, and add much more public transport, renewable energy, organic agriculture 
not reliant upon pesticides, a ‘zero-waste’ philosophy and a new ethos of consumption. 
The South Durban activists and the national Million Climate Jobs campaign want society 
to adopt this approach, but they remain on a collision course with Transnet, its 
financiers, the Treasury and Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission, as 
well as the municipality. Unlike the Medupi campaign from February to April 2010, 
there is far more time for mobilisation of advocacy pressure to halt Transnet’s access to 
external financing, and hence the project itself.  
 
In October 2012, at a Presidential Infrastructure Investment Conference in 
Johannesburg, Deputy Public Works Minister Jeremy Cronin confessed what is patently 
obvious in the neo-colonial SA economy: ‘Too much of our development has been 
plantation to port, mine to port.’ Instead, we need ‘social infrastructure, such as water, 
hospitals, schools, and housing, in order to prevent the kind of protests witnessed 
recently in the mining sector.’28 Cronin’s influence notwithstanding, this rhetoric is 
probably just a case of ‘talk-left, invest-right’: in mega-projects like Medupi and South 
Durban’s port sprawl, against the interests of people and planet, and instead on behalf 
of corporate profits. In these respects, there was more continuity than change in the 
pre-1994 and post-1994 eras. For many years, such mega-projects have dominated 
corporate investment, and these have always entailed very generous state-supported 
subsidies, usually associated with mining (Free State Goldfields), smelters (Alusaf, 
Columbus), airports and ports (Richards Bay, Saldanha, Coega), mega-dams (Gariep, 
Lesotho), coal-fired powerplants and other energy projects (Mossgas, Sasol oil-from-
coal) and special projects (sports stadiums and the Gautrain).  
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Investment in South African mega-projects, 1946-2012
 
Source: SA Reserve Bank 
 
What this means is that there remains a formidable lobby for fossil-fuel based 
infrastructure investment in SA, ranging from mining houses to the construction 
industry. The elite mandate is to ‘mine more and faster and ship what we mine cheaper 
and faster’, as Business Day editor Peter Bruce ordained just as Finance Minister Pravin 
Gordhan was finalising his $100 billion infrastructure budget in February 2012.29  
 
Thanks to this philosophy, South African ecological problems have become far worse, 
according to the government’s 2006 Environmental Outlook research report, which 
noted ‘a general decline in the state of the environment’.30 By 2012, SA’s ‘Environmental 
Performance Index’ slipped to 5th worst of 133 countries surveyed by Columbia and 
Yale University researchers.31 For example, Gauteng, the country’s main megalopolis, 
experienced water scarcity and water table pollution, when the first two Lesotho mega-
dams were built during the late 1990s with World Bank financing. There were not only 
destructive environmental consequences downriver, but the extremely costly cross-
catchment water transfer to Johannesburg raised water prices, thus, deterring 
consumption by poor people in low-income townships.  
 
With this level of degradation, it is no surprise that there is such intense labour, social 
and environmentalist resistance. The 2012-15World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Reports placed SA in the world-leading position for adverse employee-
employer relations out of the 140 countries surveyed.32 And in the last measurement of 
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protests recorded by police, there was a marked increase after 2011, from violent 
incidents numbering in the triple digits from 1994 to 2011, and then rising to 1882 in 
2012-13 and 2300 in 2013-14.33  
 
South Durban’s experience so far corresponds to more general conclusions about 
community contestations of industrial activity as a result of global-local rescaling 
processes sometimes termed ‘glocalisation. In the face of the widespread yet elusive 
power of transnational corporations, civil society nonetheless continually pressures 
companies to reduce environmental and social impacts from their activities,’ as Leah 
Horowitz explains: 
 
Protestors may use direct action, such as violent attacks, or discursive action, 
including court battles as well as attempts to tarnish the companies’ reputations, 
which are increasingly important in a globalised world. All these costs contribute 
to ‘the internalisation of externalities’. Beyond direct costs to corporations, these 
actions influence the financial sector as investors realise that companies pass 
financial and reputational risks on to the institutions that support them, and that 
a company’s management of environmental and social issues may provide an 
indication of its ability to tackle other management problems. These concerns 
have prompted investors to screen potential funding recipients, through 
mechanisms such as the FTSE4Good Index Series, and have inspired powerful 
funding agencies such as the World Bank to impose directives upon clients.34 
 
Attempts to change South Africa’s carbon-intensive, export-oriented economic policy 
have failed, thus far, and one harbinger of the coming conflict was in January 2014 when 
in Parliament, SDCEA was prevented from testifying about the port-petrochem complex 
during hearings on a fast-track Infrastructure Development Bill which passed a few 
weeks later, and which will reduce to a maximum of one year the approval processes for 
EIAs and other permits. As a result, if the project does not suffer more delays due to the 
overarching world capitalist stagnation of shipping, the only obvious pressure point will 
be for SDCEA to attack Transnet’s financing.  
 
What is at stake in South Durban, as in so many other similar sites of micropolitical-
ecological struggle, is whether common sense prevails over profits. That calculus has to 
be swung in the favour of the former, by reducing the latter, perhaps through non-
violent civil disobedience of the sort pioneered in Durban in 1913 by Mahatma Gandhi; 
i.e., of the sort international anti-apartheid activists used to assist in ending apartheid. 
The most powerful weapon was financial sanctions. And whether the World Bank and 
other international lenders – including China and the coming BRICS New Development 
Bank – can be compelled to avoid new Transnet financing, is a matter of organising 
prowess. 
 
Durban activists connecting dots against economic and environmental violence 
 
Aside from the top-down threats of capitalist irrationality, the greatest risk to Durban’s 
proposed port-petrochemical complex expansion is the repertoire of mandatory tools in 
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any activist’s toolbox: popular education, democratic decision-making, mass-based 
organisation, linkages of people across interest areas leading to new alliances, unity of 
purpose, an ability to transcend divisions, powerful analysis, fluidity and pragmatism 
combined with a profound commitment to eco-social justice principles, and effective 
strategies and tactics. If sustained, it is this that can be termed the ‘double movement’ 
against the economic and environmental violence emanating from above. 
 
The logic explored in this paper, in contrast, is much more similar to the ‘double 
movement’ analysed by Karl Polanyi and updated by Michael Burawoy.35 It identifies 
the logic of capital as imposing increasing costs that are externalised. In prior eras, this 
required the North’s anti-capitalist resistance forces – primarily organised labour but 
also social movements, and social-democratic and even further-left parties – to generate 
a social logic as the double movement. By the time of the most recent capitalist crisis, 
the need for a red-green movement with a transcendent eco-social logic is all too 
obvious, especially with catastrophic climate change bearing down. 
 
Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ in the West, with socio-ecological uprisings anticipated 
 
Source: Burawoy (2014) 
 
There is not sufficient space in the rest of this paper to do more than reveal some of the 
double-movement discourses being developed in South Durban by SDCEA activists and 
their allies. However, it is also vital to point out that one set of allies operated in the 
Glebelands Hostel in Umlazi, where from March 2014 to November 2015 there were 54 
assassinations, of which the vast majority (documented by Vanessa Burger) were 
members of the resident association and other community groups. That kind of violence 
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seems to have a logic comparable to the 1980s internecine battles between oppressed 
KwaZulu-Natal residents (in that case playing out as Inkatha versus United Democratic 
Front). The logic is of state and political control, in contrast to the economic and 
environmental violence associated with the current stage of capitalist crisis, for which a 
different logic exists (as discussed in the Introduction), and against which a different 
kind of resistance has emerged. 
 
The resistance is difficult to characterise scientifically because it is so diverse and 
inchoate. For at least two decades, South Africa has witnessed what are probably the 
most prolific protests in the world dedicated to improved ‘service delivery’ – i.e. 
demonstrations against lack of (or excessively expensive) water and sanitation, 
electricity, housing, clinics, schools, roads and the like). These have occurred in South 
Durban, but as ever, the challenge is linking people’s immediate concerns to wider 
matters, i.e. to connect the dots between local and global and back again, and between 
economic, social and ecological matters.  
 
SDCEA’s activists were motivated by a variety of minor victories against polluting 
industries. In two cases, substantial landfills that were used as toxic dumps by unethical 
waste companies were shut down. SDCEA leaders of those campaigns, Bobby Peek and 
Desmond D’Sa, were successful in 1996 (Umlazi) and 2012 (Chatsworth), respectfully, 
and in each case they won the Goldman Environmental Prize for Africa two years later 
as a result. SDCEA recorded other victories, notably against the Engen and Sapref 
refineries which are collectively the largest refinery zone in Africa. Because of SDCEA 
lobbying, they both installed SO2 scrubbers so South Durban is not nearly as thick with 
airborne pollution and the sickly-sweet smells of chemical emissions. 
 


















SDCEA’s own strength ebbs and flows, as does any civil society institution fighting 
injustices where the adverse balance of forces is so glaring. In an earlier stage of 
opposition to the port-petrochemical expansion, in 2004-05, SDCEA gathered thousands 
of residents to halt a major link road planned from the city’s main southern freeway to 
the port. In 2006 SDCEA began campaigning against the doubling of the oil pipeline 
capacity and its rerouting through South Durban. In 2008, SDCEA used the EIA to 
challenge the climate implications of a major project for the first time. But at that stage, 
neither protests nor allegations (quite valid) of environmental racism nor EIA 
interventions slowed Transnet; Gigaba openly admitted the roughshod way Transnet 
treated such contestation led to numerous problems in the pipeline’s implementation. 
 
In 2011, Durban municipal City Manager Mike Sutcliffe – perhaps the city’s most 
controversial leader in history – drew up a secret plan, estimated to cost the equivalent 
of $25 billion, for the entire South Durban Basin. The plan reflected many decades of 
official ambition to re-engineer the Basin, in the wake of the 1940s-60s attacks on black 
residents which turned South Durban communities into racial enclaves. Racial 
settlement patterns existed nearly entirely enchanged into the second decade of 
democracy, with the exception of Clairwood’s desegregation by shack settlers as urban 
blighting began in the 1990s. Sutcliffe’s master plan was only unveiled to the public in 
mid-2012 at which point a half-dozen community meetings called by the city under the 
rubric of public participation were taken over by SDCEA activists, led by D’Sa. A near 
unanimous sentiment was expressed in meeting after meeting: close down the event 
and refuse to have it declared a form of tick-off participation. The main planner, 
consultant Graham Muller, was repeatedly frustrated. 
 
The narrative in the August 2012 pamphlet, ‘ACT NOW! EXPANDING PORT, POLLUTION 
AND FREIGHT THREATEN SOUTH DURBAN’ is worthy of even brief consideration 
because, like a poster for a March 2014 SDCEA protest at Durban’s City Hall, it helps 
reveal activist attempts to link issues and constituencies. The first of eight SDCEA 
critiques in the pamphlet was that ‘We need one planning process. The municipality 
refuses to discuss the port expansion projects, which are spear-headed by Transnet.’ 
The city’s strategy was to join Transnet in fragmenting the long 2014-2040 process of 
approval, construction and operation so that the vast implications for the entire project 
are not collected in any single moment of opposition. In reply, SDCEA demanded ‘a 
single participation process with all spheres of government, developers and 
communities to chart a sustainable and common way forward. Otherwise we will be 
arguing one puzzle piece at a time and will never change the overall picture.’ 
 
The second critique was ‘Cost vs. Benefit… Proponents boast 130 000 permanent jobs 
will be created – is this accurate? If correct this means a high capital investment of 
$190 000/job created. What other ways could this money be invested to create 
sustainable livelihoods without the terrible social and environmental impacts? Are the 
full costs – including community destruction, adverse health effects, and our greater 
contribution to climate change – being considered?’ Activists suspected the jobs 
calculation was far out of touch with reality given, as noted earlier, that even the largest 
container ships are designed to have crew numbering less than two dozen (13 in the 






The third critique also questioned the planners’ understanding of global shipping 
demand: ‘Is the expansion justified? Transnet are arguing expansion based on 
projections for the growth in container handling. At an 8 percent growth rate their 
projections show that a capacity of only 12 million containers will be needed by 2040 – 
yet they are building capacity for 20 million. Is this growth rate attainable given 
competition from other ports, growing resource constraints, carbon taxes on shipping, 
and global economic collapse?’ Activists pointed out that harbour efficiency was 
appalling and that Durban’s notorious status of world’s highest-cost port would not be 
changed by adding $25 billion in capital costs given high interest rates affecting 
repayment of loans plus high operating and maintenance costs.  
 
The fourth critique was that ‘Increased containers mean increased impacts,’ and that 
this would translate into ‘8x the traffic, pollution and noise… There will also be an 
increase in Port related illegal activity including smuggling, drug trafficking, 
prostitution and shebeens’ (informal pubs). 
 
The fifth was of the ‘wrong fossil fuel development model. Port expansion will serve 
increased imports of consumer goods (60 percent of container cargo are imports to 
Gauteng), expansion of petro-chemical industries & fuel storage and the automotive 
industry (Toyota). This does not take into account dwindling resources, especially oil, 
and the need to stop climate change.’ 
 
The sixth was the environmental risk: ‘In addition to increasing climate change, port 
expansion will increase large water areas within the south Durban flood plain while 
removing the last natural wetlands. Toxic industry is also expanding in the basin. This 
increases the potential for flooding and hazardous chemical spills as extreme weather 
events increase.’ Moreover, ‘the Bay’s estuarine ecosystem has been compromised to 
the point that it has lost resilience… The Bay provides a critical breeding ground for reef 
associated and migratory marine fish. 132 species of birds are found here and 62 
species of endangered, migratory birds rest and feed here.’ The sandbank’s destruction 
in the first phase would wreck any remaining chance of restoring the harbour’s 
ecological integrity. 
 
The seventh was the resulting ‘Community upheaval... Clairwood is earmarked for 
rezoning to logistics with some light industry. 6000+ people will be forced to relocate 
through market pressure, and with no active community present will inevitably result 
in the degeneration of historic cultural sites in the area. The port expansion requires 
878 hectares of land for containers!’ 
 
The eighth critique was to ask, ‘Freight – rail or road? The documents make reference to 
rail and interchange nodes. However, the documents refer to ‘freight routes’ which on 
some plans are shown as rail but more recently as roads.’ Just over a year later, on the 
Field’s Hill slope through the main mountain pass towards Durban, 24 people were 
killed by a runaway truck carrying a container belonging to Taiwanese-based shipping 
behemoth Evergreen. It was being freighted from Johannesburg by a small Durban truck 
transport agency, which skimped on paying toll fees (staying on the main highway with 
its more gradual slope would have cost $4 more), hired as a driver a low-paid Swazi 
national with an illegitimate license, and failed to have its faulty brakes repaired before 





throughway (Solomon Mhlangu Drive) in March 2012 had forewarned of this kind of 
risk, given that there were 7000 accidents in Durban in 2010 involving trucks, leaving 
more than 70 fatalities. In Clairwood alone, trucking companies invading the residential 
area with illegally zoned truck yards, and accidents there and on nearby Bluff roads had 
killed nine residents in the prior five years. The Clairwood community leader who 
opposed trucks the most vigorously, Ahmed Osman, was assassinated in April 2009, 
shot dead on his front porch in one of many unsolved crimes involving the deaths of 
Durban activists. 
 
In spite of such dangers (D’Sa himself was a target of a nighttime firebombing in his 
working-class flat in December 2007), the rhythm of street protest is also revealing. As 
the municipality and Transnet began public consultations in 2012, SDCEA activists were 
able to use the mass meetings as rallying points. For example, in September 2012, 
Clairwood’s established Indian residents most immediately threatened by the existing 
harbour’s expansion invited then Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan – who thirty years 
earlier was a community organiser against apartheid housing in those very streets – to 
make a presentation defending Transnet and the city. He attempted to do so, using the 
standard neoliberal narrative of international competition, and specifically the threat 
that Maputo would get ahead in port traffic to Johannesburg (itself a reasonable 
proposition given that it is a shorter route without the Durban-Johannesburg 
mountainous terrain to cross). Tellingly, however, Gordhan also hinted that a divide-
and-conquer strategy lay ahead against SDCEA activists, because Clairwood is also a site 
of several thousand black African shackdwellers barely surviving in informal 
settlements, backyard slums and even large tents. Fires regularly ravage these 
residents’ shacks, destroying their belongings and often injuring (and even occasionally 
killing) people, including one night-time blaze that wrecked a double-yard settlement of 
500 shacks in mid-2013. The mainly middle-class audience of traditional homeowners 
of Indian ethnic origin were reminded by Gordhan that the ANC’s ability to mobilise in a 
relatively desegregated Clairwood could haunt a coming political showdown, in which 
those with the most to lose were Indians in Clairwood and Merebank, followed by those 
in the mainly Coloured area of Wentworth (which suffers the most pollution) and the 
traditionally white Bluff area. 
 
Still, three months later, in December 2012, several hundred people heeded SDCEA’s 
call to block the back port entrance, leaving a three kilometer long queue of trucks. 
Protests slowed in 2013 as the port EIA process and other high-profile debates with 
Transnet and municipal politicians took priority. But by March 2014, when SDCEA held 
a march to City Hall of 800 residents, new issues and constituencies were added to the 
coalition, including farmers on the old airport land who are to be displaced as the Dug-
Out Port is built, and subsistence fisherfolk whose access to the existing harbour was 
contested from the time of the 9/11 bombings – thus generating US paranoia over port 
security – until in 2013 they were permitted back into their traditional fishing area.  
 
The challenge for connecting dots and adding issue areas will continue to arise. One 
potentially important development occurred in 2014 when the Umlazi Unemployed 
People’s Movement (UPM) joined the anti-port coalition, for their ultimate ambition is 
to have the old airport land turned into low-income housing and labour-intensive 
industrial cooperatives. There is also potential for the country’s largest trade union, the 





a United Front linking workers, residents, environmentalists, women and youth. If 
Numsa succeeds in taking over the organisation and representation of Durban port 
workers – as they were doing down the coast at the Coega container terminal due to 
disillusionment with the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union – and in the 
process evoking genuine eco-socialist politics, if the UPM leads land invasions at the 
airport before the digging is due to begin (presently not scheduled, following the 
November 2015 delay), and if Clairwood shackdwellers and nearby worker-hostel 
residents in Umbilo and Jacobs become better organised, then the threat of racial 
divisions would fade.  
 
However, it must be conceded, finally, that although there is a SDCEA vision for a South 
Durban Basin economic and social development philosophy that transcends port and 
petrochemical activities, the network has remained weak when it came to making 
explicit demands towards this end. As SDCEA’s 2012 pamphlet reported, ‘We must 
urgently invest in a post-fossil fuel development path including renewable technologies 
and resilience to climate impacts. Are we giving up our land, environment and 
community to facilitate imports feeding rampant consumerism?’ But aside from 
defensive gestures, a genuine strategy for a Just Transition in South Durban still lies 
ahead. 
 
Conclusion: Urban alliances against capitalist violence 
 
That stark choice confronts not only SDCEA, South Durban residents and the broader 
city – but the country and world as a whole. With the capitalist ‘development model’ 
representing by far the greatest risk to the continuation of a decent life on a climate-
constrained planet, and with inequality and political degradation out of control in South 
Africa and across the globe, the showdown over South Durban’s future might, in 
microcosm, signal whether disparate forces can find unity in opposition, and use that 
unity to plan a future based on less risky ways of arranging economy, society and 
nature. 
 
The search for powerful urban alliances against top-down economic and environmental 
violence of the sort described above will continue far beyond South Durban. Across the 
world, uneven urban development spawned by the rule of capital and the intensification 
of commodification is being vigorously contested by popular movements, with sites like 
Gezi Park in Istanbul, Rio de Janeiro prior to the World Cup, Egypt’s Tahrir Square, and 
New York’s Zuccotti Park just the highest profile of many central-city popular 
occupations, as the ongoing capitalist crisis continues to displace its contradictions onto 
urban residents and workers.  
 
As austerity hits South Africa in coming years, the urgency for such shows of strength is 
intensifying, what with 2015 witnessing cuts of approximately 4 percent in state grants to 
poor people, with a neoliberal finance minister re-installed at capital’s insistence in late 
2015, and with more budget cuts demanded by ratings agencies in coming years. Yet the 
university students’ formidable October 2015 protests taught the society that it is 
possible to win major concessions, in that case by making alliances with precarious 
workers and taking control of urban spaces (in the vicinity of their campuses), but also 





parliament in Cape Town on 21 October, at the ruling party’s Johannesburg headquarters 
on 22 October and at the president’s office in Johannesburg on 23 October. 
 
Across the world, this scale-jump is increasingly vital. Some movements have, in the 
process, begun to transcend the traditional dichotomy between an inward-looking 
territorial identity and the rhetoric of a broader emancipation, one expression of which 
has been termed the ‘Right to the City.’ Such a framing may optimally be seen not 
narrowly as mere constitutionalist ‘rights talk’ – which in South Africa soon hit 
Constitutional Court ceilings36 – but more broadly in terms of arguments spelled out in 
Henri Levebvre’s The Urban Revolution and David Harvey’s Rebel Cities.37 There, the 
critical formulation of anti-capitalism is neither Leninist (with a vanguard socialist party 
at the helm) nor autonomist (the danger signified by the Occupy movement’s too-rapid 
demise in late 2011), nor Keynesian and social democratic (in the sense of harking back 
to the municipal patronage politics of a more generous 20th century state), but instead, 
the generation of alliances between disgruntled social forces during periods of urban 
upheaval such as the present. 
 
These disgruntled urban rebels are beginning to explore a broader set of urban class-
alliance practices, which in the Latin American case – according to James Petras and 
Morris Morley – generate new movements that traverse the spheres of production and 
collective consumption, under conditions of persistent capitalist crisis: 
 
The power of these new social movements comes from the fact that they 
draw on the vast heterogeneous labour force that populates the main 
thoroughfares and the alleyways; the marketplaces and street corners; the 
interstices of the economy and the nerve centers of production; the 
exchange and finance centers; the university plazas, railway stations and 
the wharves – all are brought together in complex localised structures 
which feed into tumultuous homogenising national movements.38 
 
The main structural factor forging the unity of the urban poor and the formal working 
class, Petras and Morley continue, is economic crisis itself. ‘The great flows of capital 
disintegrate the immobile isolated household units, driving millions into the vortex of 
production and circulation of commodities; this moment of wrenching dislocation and 
relocation is silently, individually experienced by the mass of people, who struggle to find 
their place, disciplined by the struggle for basic needs and by the absolute reign of 
ascending capital.’ Under such conditions, the social base for urban movements is 
continually recreated at the point that the limits to both commodity production and 
consumption become evident. 
 
With respect to production, Petras and Morley on the one hand view the rise of militant 
urban social movements as a consequence of the sudden increase in mass unemployment 
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since the 1980s debt crises began, which ‘lifted the control and discipline of capital over 
labour – making the latter available for, and receptive to, a new kind of discipline: that 
associated with the structure and action of mass social movements.’ On the other hand, a 
complementary explanation – not grounded in the formal sector labour market 
(unemployment) – also presents itself: ‘It comes down to this. Capital transformed an 
inert mass of atomised producers into a concentrated army; and the market that it 
created could not sustain it. The impersonal ties – the cash nexus – are the only link in 
that anonymous urban labour market. The rupture of that tie sets the stage for the 
eruption of uprooted people.’ 
 
Kim Moody expresses this potential in a port city like Durban as follows: 
 
Port labour can be important to a coalition. Port expansion has often been used 
to de-unionise a large portion of total labour and weaken the existing unions. 
Also, new facilities will tend to undercut older, unionised ones so a good union 
has reason to oppose such expansion and not fall for the usual line about new 
jobs. This is what happened to the warehouse and trucking workers in the ports 
of LA and Long Beach – though not the dockers themselves. In the UK, new ‘state-
of-the-art’ facilities – London Gateway (which is resisting the union UNITE) – will 
compete with older facilities in the Thames estuary like Tilbury, where the 
employers are already demanding that the port workers go on zero hours 
contracts.39 
 
The ultimate test is whether the linkages sketched in the case above, ranging from 
citizenries and residents, to labour movements and environmentalists, can find unity. If 
in specific cases they do, and these fuse with the broader political-economic processes 
of overproduction, shipping overcapacity and falling prices, it may be that the danger to 
the city of an overambitious mercantile circuit of capital can be avoided. But this short-
circuiting of capital, and its replacement by a broad-based Right to the City, are political 
projects that require ideology and analysis just as much as effective strategy and tactics, 
powerful alliances and social militancy. The brain and the hands of the oppressed in 
Durban – and everywhere else – need to operate much more collaboratively in future, so 
as to avoid the amputation of city life we have seen in recent years, given capital’s 
emphasis on accumulation-by-commerce.   
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